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Human Gene Patents and the Question of Liberal Morality 
 
THEO PAPAIOANNOU1 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the establishment of the Human Genome Project and the identification of genes 
in human DNA that play a role in human diseases and disorders, a long, moral and 
political, battle has began over the extension of IPRs to information contained in 
human genetic material. According to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, over the past 
20 years, large numbers of human genes have been the subject of thousands of patent 
applications. This paper examines whether human gene patents can be justified in 
terms of liberal theories of morality such as natural law, personality development, just 
reward and social utility. It is argued that human gene patents are in conflict with 
fundamental principles of liberal morality and justice because they result in “genetic 
information feudalism”.  
 
Introduction 
 
In the literature of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), patenting is considered to be a 
statutory and moral way of increasing innovations and boosting technological 
development.2 For this reason, individual rights to patents have been extended to 
almost all knowledge-intensive sectors, including health care. For instance, in recent 
years, there have been a number of legislative attempts to protect human genetic 
materials. Among them are the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnology Inventions in 1998 and the subsequent United Kingdom (UK) law via 
the Patent Regulations in 2000. 
 
This paper draws on my recent critique of the moral foundations of IPRs3 in order to 
address the following question: can human gene patents be justified in terms of liberal 
theories of morality4? The latter include the theories of natural law, personality 
development, just reward and social utility. The argument of this paper is that 
extension of IPRs such as patents to human genetic materials is not morally 
defensible. Human gene patents are in conflict with fundamental principles of liberal 
morality and justice. In fact, these principles are sacrificed for the sake of “genetic 
information feudalism”. 
 
The argument is structured as follows: The first section focuses on liberal theories of 
morality and IPRs; next, I examine the case of human gene patents; and I conclude 
that IPRs are morally indefensible.  
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Liberal Theories of Morality and IPRs 
 
Natural Law 
The first liberal attempt to justify IPRs morally is in terms of the natural law theory. 
Specifically, it is stated that IPRs are moral-claim rights that each individual has 
naturally, independently of the laws of government.5  
 
The moral justification of IPRs on the grounds of natural law derives from Locke’s 
theory of private property. As is well known in his Second Treatise of Government, 
Locke introduces the principle of self-ownership as a natural right of each individual 
to her own person and labour.6 Owning herself, each person is free to do with her 
powers whatever she chooses so long as she does not cause or threaten harm to non-
consenting others.7 On the grounds of self-ownership, Locke forms his mixing labour 
theory that justifies private property as a natural right. According to him: “The Labour 
of [Man’s] Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in 
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property”.8  
 
Locke’s theory of private property is theologically founded. Locke believes that God 
gave the world to human beings in common and provided them with reason to make 
use of it to the best advantage of their life.9 This theological position leads to the 
theoretical development of two provisos. The first is the “enough and as good” 
proviso: private appropriation is morally justified only if it leaves enough and as 
good to newcomers. The second is the “no waste” proviso: privately appropriated 
resources must be used, otherwise they become common again.10 Both provisos create 
limits to individual property rights and develop presuppositions of social 
reproduction.  
 
In the liberal tradition of thought, writers such as Hughes appear to believe that the 
conception of IPRs as moral-claim rights founded upon self-ownership is theoretically 
sustainable.11 Hughes’s defence of IPRs is based on three propositions: first, that 
production of intangible resources (eg, non-physical recourses), such as ideas, 
knowledge and information requires a person’s labour; second, that these recourses 
are appropriated from a “common” which is not significantly devaluated by their 
removal; and third, that intangible recourses can be appropriated without violating the 
“enough and as good” and “non-waste” provisos.12 The question, of course, is 
whether these propositions hold true? Can the Lockean provisos be applied in IPRs?  
 
Let us begin with Hughes’s first proposition that production of intangible resources 
requires a person’s labour. This proposition is above all individualistic. As Richards13 
points out, ideas, but also knowledge and information, are the result of social rather 
than individual creation. Indeed, a person’s labour in creating these intangible 
resources has to be conceived as intellectual labour based on interactive learning 
within society. It is not really meaningful to say that it is the specific person who is 
the individual creator of intangible resources. As has been argued elsewhere14, each 
person lives because scarcity is inescapable and she lives in society because she 
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cannot by herself deal with certain aspects of her scarcity. Knowledge and 
information as such are important aspects of each person’s scarcity. The problem can 
only be resolved through the contribution of society as a whole. This contribution 
does not only consist of the relational context of social interaction but also of 
tangibles resources. For instance, it is well known that several drugs for HIV/AIDS 
treatments were originally developed with the help of pubic funds in the United 
States.15 In this sense, every person ought to have free access to knowledge and 
information. Hughes’s interpretation of Locke is rather anachronistic16 and fails to 
advance a convincing argument about the relevance of the mixing-labour theory for 
the moral justification of IPRs.17 
 
The problem of anachronism is also apparent in Hughes’ second proposition that 
intangible resources are held in common until some individuals legitimately 
appropriate them.18 This proposition is problematical. In fact, ideas, knowledge and 
information are neither developed outside of society nor are somehow distributed to 
all human beings in common until some individuals mix their labour with them. There 
are not ideas, knowledge and information commons in the sense that Locke intended 
by “commons”. The world does not come furnished with ideas, knowledge and 
information objects that can be readily appropriated the way an apple can be picked 
from a tree.19  Ideas, knowledge and information are produced with the contribution 
of society as a whole but become alienated under the capitalist social structure of 
private property.20 Classical liberal theories abstract from this fundamental 
contradiction of capitalism, due to their individualism.  
 
Now let us examine Hughes’s third proposition on the Lockean provisos. Is it 
plausible to maintain that private appropriation of intangible resources (non-physical 
property) leaves “enough and as good” to other individuals and satisfies the “no 
waste” proviso? Hughes thinks that as long as there is a growing common of ideas, 
knowledge and information everyone has an opportunity to make appropriation.21 
Therefore, in his view, both provisos are satisfied. Hughes’s view is again 
unconvincing. Even if there were a growing common of intangible resources and even 
if each individual could make appropriation, this would not always be according to 
her preferences and thus the principle of self-ownership would be violated. For 
instance, some individuals might appropriate unique or basic scientific-ideas, 
knowledge and information, and thereby cause or threaten harm to non-consenting 
others.22  
 
IPRs also violate the “no waste” proviso. This proviso states that private appropriation 
of new and valuable intangible resources via patents ought not to involve waste. 
Although Hughes23 dismisses the “no waste” proviso as irrelevant, Richards24 
correctly argues that “The history of patents is rife with example of cases where new 
ideas and innovations have been delayed or permanently lost by interests who used 
patents to prolong their existing intellectual and physical capital stock”. 
 
Certainly, in the Lockean spirit of thought, one can find more sophisticated arguments 
than those of Hughes. For instance, Moore25 provides a Lockean theory of IP, 
interpreting the “enough and as good” proviso as a version of weak Pareto-
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superiority. According to him, “The proviso permits individuals to better themselves 
so long as no one is worsened (weak Pareto-superiority) […] If no one is harmed by 
an acquisition and one person is bettered then the acquisition ought to be 
permitted”.26 Moore seems to follow Nozick’s path27 in trying to reformulate the 
Lockean proviso. As has been argued elsewhere,28 the application of this Paretian 
version of “enough and as good” proviso in IP may work in some cases. “For 
instance, the appropriation of a “non-extraordinary” idea (i.e. an idea that is neither 
basic nor unique) may not worsen the situation of anyone, leaving ‘enough and as 
good’ ‘non-extraordinary’ ideas for everyone”.29 However, in some other cases, as 
Himma points out, “ it is not entirely clear […] that IP protection does not make 
others worse off than they would have been. If A discovers the only possible cure for 
cancer and perversely decides to withhold it from everyone with cancer, the cance
patients seem worse off in the following sense: they had a positive chance of s
prior to A’s exclusive appropriation since, after all, someone else might have 
discovered it and made it freely available; now this c 30
r 
urvival 
hance is denied them”.  
 
Himma,31 through his critical approach to Locke’s theory, provides a different 
justification for IP. Specifically, he stresses that there are two interpretations of 
Locke’s argument of original acquisition of property. One interpretation emphasises 
the mixing-labour theory while the other focuses on improvement and creation of 
value through labour. However, Himma notes that both interpretations of Locke’s 
argument depend on the assumption that we causally interact with pre-existing 
material objects. This assumption does not apply to intellectual content. Himma 
argues that knowledge and information are abstract objects with which we cannot 
causally interact. Thus, as he puts it, “If I cannot causally interact with abstract 
objects, then I can neither mix my labour with an abstract object nor use my labour to 
create new value by improving some existing abstract intellectual object”.32 For 
Himma, the Lockean argument has to be modified in order to apply to intellectual 
objects. Thus, he suggests a justification of protection of intellectual property on the 
grounds of strong interests of creators in the intangible resources they create and in 
the time and effort they expend in creating them. 
 
Although Himma may be right in stressing the problems of application of the Lockean 
argument to intellectual objects, he is rather incorrect in believing that the strong 
interests of creators provide moral justification for protecting intellectual property. 
There is no moral reason why a creator, who has stronger interests than others in 
specific intangible recourses, should have the right to exclusive use of these recourses. 
The fact that a creator has stronger interests than others in specific intangible 
resources does not imply that others have no interests at all in these resources. Why is 
it that those creators’ interests can only be morally served through IP and not through 
something else, say, for instance, recognition for their achievements in community? 
Are creators’ interests in intangible resources only material interests? What about 
creators like, for instance, those involved in Open Source and Synthetic Biology? 
Isn’t the case that Open Source and Synthetic Biology33 creators expend time, energy 
and labour but believe that their interests ought not to be served through their 
exclusive use of ideas, knowledge and information? Are these creators “…in need of 
medical or psychological treatment”?34 
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Personality Development 
The second liberal attempt to justify IPRs is in terms of the theory of personality 
development. In this attempt, IPRs constitute a moral necessity for the development of 
each individual’s personality.35 The latter can only be adequately expressed in ethical 
community. That is a liberal realm in which free contracts and free exchange take 
place. IPRs are thought to be moral rights because they facilitate the development of 
each individual’s personality in ethical community. 
 
The moral justification of IPRs in terms of personality development derives from 
Hegel’s theory of property. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel conceives private 
property as an abstract right related to human needs and freedom.36 He insists that, in 
order to satisfy their physical needs and develop their individuality and freedom, 
people need to have control of resources. In Hegel’s theory, freedom is conceived as 
each individual’s ability to form abstract thoughts and to relate them to particular 
needs and desires.37 Personality is viewed as a part of the inner subjective world of 
each individual. Hegel stresses that both freedom and personality must be translated 
into the external objective world by means of private property. In his theory, the 
individual who owns an object is able to abstract herself in thought from any 
particular need and to embody her free will and personality into that object. Denial of 
this personal link to an object results in alienation.38  
 
Hegel’s concept of alienation plays a key role in his justification of private property. 
Hegel thinks that those individuals, who are alienated from their property or those 
who are propertyless, fail to get recognition as persons in community. In his thought, 
only property owners can be recognised as persons entering into free contractual 
relationships.39 Hegel’s concept of ethical community refers to the liberal market 
place as one moment of ethical life. That is the specific social context rooted to 
custom and tradition of the ancient city-states.40 Property in this context is not 
absolute (unlimited) but is legally constrained by the laws of ethical community.41 
 
The question is whether justification of IPRs as a necessity for personality 
development can be theoretically sustained. Hegel’s answer is clear: creators are the 
legitimate owners of their intellectual products. He also argues that “Single products 
of my particular and mental skill and of my power to act I can alienate to someone 
else and I can give him the use of my abilities for restricted period, because, on the 
strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire external relation to the totality and 
universality of my being”.42 This argument aims to resolve the problem of IP 
exchange. For Hegel, such exchange is possible because it does not necessarily 
alienate the creator from the “universal ways and means of multiplying […] books 
and machines”.43  
 
As has been argued elsewhere,44 the Hegelian justification of IPRs is quite 
problematical. First of all, the personality argument fails with regard to epistemology. 
As Hughes says, personality is manifested to varying degrees in different objects. We 
might assume that a person who writes a poem expresses a different degree of 
personality from a person who writes a scientific paper because the latter is more 
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neutral (or less personal) than the former. But how do we know that one IP creation 
(say, in poetry) embodies more personality than another (IP creation in poetry)? 
Should more personality embodied in IP imply more protection of IP? What about 
those IP products which express little or no personality of their creators?45 Does, after 
all, ownership of one’s personality also translate into ownership of the expressions of 
personality?46 
 
The second aspect in which the Hegelian justification of IPRs fails is that of social 
recognition. At this point, a number of questions can be also raised. What is social 
recognition and how does it come about? Can social recognition only be expressed 
through private property rights? Is Hughes right to argue that recognition follows 
from payments made to the property creator?47 Or, is Richards right to point out that 
recognition comes, for instance, through publications in journals and in other media 
which provide no direct compensation to their creators?48 It might be said that both 
Hughes and Richards are incorrect in their views of social recognition. IP creators 
might receive direct compensation for their time and energy or they might publish 
extensively but still they might not be socially recognised. The reason for this is that 
social recognition rather depends on whether essential social needs are satisfied. IP 
can only satisfy commercial needs generated within the capitalist market, taking the 
form of individual needs. Essential needs outside the market realm remain unsatisfied. 
These needs include the development of presuppositions of social reproduction. 
 
Just Reward 
The third attempt to justify IPRs morally is in terms of the theory of just reward. 
According to this theory, IPRs constitute a just reward for enterprise and merit. 
Individual creators of intangible resources such as innovators and inventors morally 
deserve to be rewarded for their qualities and talents. 
 
The moral justification of IPRs on the grounds of just reward mainly derives from 
libertarianism.49 Libertarians50 defend principles of justice which require that each 
individual is entitled to her talents and abilities. Whatever goods are acquired on the 
basis of natural talents and abilities are considered to be just. Libertarians argue that 
just distribution results from people’s free exchanges.51 For instance, Nozick 
advances an “entitlement theory of justice” based on three distributive principles: 
 
“1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle 
of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is 
entitled to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications 
of I and 2.”52 
 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice can be translated as follows: if I own an 
intangible resource, then principle 1 tells us how the resource came to be owned; 
principle 2 says that I am free to transfer my intangible resource as I wish; principle 3 
tells us what to do in the case of violation of principles 1 and 2. Nozick’s entitlement 
theory implies that if people’s current intangible resources are justly acquired (eg, if 
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they are not stolen from others), then just distribution can only take place in the free 
market. People have the right to sell and buy ideas, knowledge and information, 
benefiting from free exchange. The state is not morally justified to intervene in order 
to redistribute the benefits of these intangible resources to naturally disadvantaged or 
less creative people. Only the owners of intangible resources can decide on such 
redistribution. In order to illustrate his position, Nozick explicitly uses the example of 
a person who “finds a new substance in an out-of-the way place. He discovers that it 
effectively treats a certain disease and appropriates the total supply”. Nozick clearly 
justifies this appropriation on two grounds: first, on the grounds of self-ownership (eg, 
the person does not steal from others but uses his own talents and abilities) and 
second, on the grounds of reformulated Lockean proviso (eg, the person does not 
worsen the situation of others).53 
 
It might be said that Nozick’s meritocratic arguments are problematical. First of all, as 
Kymlicka points out, “the intuitive argument ignores our intuition about dealing fairly 
with unequal circumstances”.54 The principle of fairness is a “self-evident” truth that 
requires social redistribution to remedy unequal circumstances developed in the 
process of exchange. Second, the self-ownership argument fails to take account of the 
socio-economic presuppositions of natural talents and abilities. The latter remain 
natural potentialities if individuals lack the economic and social means of their 
development.55 Nozick’s self-ownership argument is implicitly founded upon a 
genetic determinism56 that, as Barry would say, is simply an expression of his 
ignorance.57  
 
Social Welfare 
All the liberal attempts to justify IPRs that we have discussed so far are 
predominantly deontological. This means that they are in competition with 
utilitarianism. The latter is a consequentialist theory of morality that holds that legal 
rules such as IPRs are justified to the extent that they promote happiness in society.58 
Certainly, there are many different versions of utilitarianism: hedonistic act 
utilitarianism, welfarist act utilitarianism, preference act utilitarianism, economic 
efficiency act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, etc. Utilitarianism, especially in its 
hedonistic version formulated by Bentham59 and Mill,60 conceives happiness as a sum 
of pleasures. “Pleasure is good and pain or displeasure is bad”.61 Utilitarianism is a 
goal-based theory concerned with the social welfare of each individual in so far as this 
contributes to a particular conception of the good.62 Therefore, this theory is in 
contradistinction with right-based theories such as natural law, personality 
development and reward-based theories of IPRs.  
 
Although it is true that the link between happiness and well-being has not been yet 
established in moral philosophy,63 it is also true that utilitarianism provides the most 
popular arguments in defence of IPRs. Thus, as Moore observes, “Beginning with the 
first Patent Act of 1790 and continuing through the adoption of Berne Convention 
standards in 1989, the basis given for Anglo-American systems of intellectual 
property is utilitarian in nature and not grounded in the natural rights of the author or 
inventor”.64 IP is considered by utilitarians to be crucial for the development of useful 
knowledge and innovations which can benefit the public, maximising social 
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welfare.65 However, critics of utilitarianism object to the conception of IPR
arrangements for maximising social welfare on the grounds that it is instrumental. 
IPRs are not intrinsically good, critics contend. If IPRs fail the utility test, then, they 
can no longer be justified in a liberal society. This implies that creators are entitled to 
their ideas, knowledge and information only in so far as these resources are valued as 
useful means for maximising social welfare. The interest of society in maximising 
welfare prevails over the property right of each creator in her intangible resources. 
Indeed, this is also the main approach of some law and economics theorists such as 
Posner
s as legal 
66 to legitimacy: the law is legitimate in so far as it promotes maximisation of 
welfare and social efficiency.67 Certainly, as Himma68 observes, there is a variety of 
law and economics positions on IP. Some theorists attempt to show that protection of 
IP fails to maximise welfare while some others take a middling position, arguing that 
some protection of IP is needed to ensure efficiency. 
 
In any case, the moral conflict between deontology and utility has serious political 
and policy implications. For instance, should government adopt policies which would 
strengthen IPRs in human genomics to increase economic growth or should it adopt 
policies which would allow all interested parties in society to have access to DNA 
sequences so that everyone can come up with new ideas for drugs development? In 
fact, this is a conflict between justice and utility.69 Although there are variations of 
utilitarianism, almost all of them argue that right actions are useful actions and not 
just actions. Just actions are right actions to the extent that they are useful actions. 
 
Apart from its instrumental nature and its conflict with deontological theories of 
justice, utilitarianism also faces the epistemological problem: how can the aggregate 
welfare produced by IPRs be objectively measured? Moral scepticists clearly dismiss 
that objective calculation of pleasure and pain can ever be possible.70 Happiness or 
well-being is subjective as it is any particular conception of the good. 
 
The Case of Human Gene Patents 
 
The Context 
 
Since the establishment of the Human Genomy Project in 1990 and the identification 
of genes in human DNA that play a role in human diseases and disorders, a long battle 
has began over the extension of IPRs to information contained in human genetic 
material. Human genetic information is clearly an intangible resource and, according 
to Nuffield Council on Bioethics: 
 
“over the past 20 years, large number of genes, section of genes and 
proteins they produce have been the subject of several thousand 
patent applications. Many patents have been granted. The 
identification and cloning of genes that produce therapeutic proteins 
has led to the development of a number of new medicines based on 
human proteins whilst the identification of genetic mutations that 
cause disease has been widely applied in the development of 
diagnostic tests for relatively rare diseases”.71  
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The Nuffield Council of Bioethics (NCB) had correctly predicted that with the 
completion of the sequencing of the human genome, there would be even more 
increase of patent applications for new medicines and treatments.72 Indeed, a recent 
study by Hopkins et al “Identified a total of 15,603 patent families claiming human 
DNA sequences published between January 1980 and December 2003. Of these, only 
one-third (5,669) contain one or more patents granted up to 2005 at one of the three 
leading patent offices: the USPTO, European Patent Office (EPO) or Japan Patent 
Office (JPO). Most of this subset (94%) contains at least one granted US patent, with 
the numbers rising sharply during the 1990s”.73 The question that arises is whether 
IPRs over human genomics can be morally justified. Can patents of human genes be 
morally grounded upon liberal principles of natural law, personality development, just 
reward and social welfare? There is a need to go on to answer this question because 
the implausibility of IPRs can only be fully understood within such a specific moral 
context. To put it another way, the specific example of human gene patents puts our 
critique of the moral foundations of IPRs in context. 
 
Before answering the question of justifiability of human gene patents, let us briefly 
examine the current patent legislation. Generally speaking, a patent applicant in 
Europe has two options: either to apply to the National Patent Office (NPO) of her 
country or to go to the European Patent Office (EPO) in Munich. As far as the United 
Kingdom (UK) law is concerned, it is the Patents Act of 1977 that covers both the 
British and the European systems for granting patents. This Act incorporates the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) of 1973 and the Community Patent Convention 
(CPC) of 1975. However, in the particular case of protection of biological materials, it 
is the European Union (EU) Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions of 1998 (98/44/EC) that regulates patents. The Directive, which became 
law in the UK via the Patents Regulation of 2000 (SI 2000, No: 2037), requires 
biotechnological inventions that meet the granting criteria of novelty, inventiveness 
and utility be patentable. From legal protectability are excluded the human body and 
simple discoveries of its elements (eg, the human body and elements which could be 
used for commercial or industrial purposes), plant and animal varieties (eg, materials 
which are protected by the International Convention on the Protection of New Plant 
Varieties) and inventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to morality or 
ordre public (eg, cloning human beings, modifying the germ line genetic identity of 
human beings, commercial uses of human embryos, modifying the genetic identity of 
animals and causing them suffering without substantial benefit to man or animals, 
etc).74  
 
However, it might be argued that the UK patent law makes a problematical 
distinction: on the one hand, it states that neither the human body nor the simple 
discovery of a sequence or partial sequence of a gene can be patented; on the other 
hand it requires that once an element such as a sequence of a gene has been isolated 
from the human body or produced by a technical process, it can be patented. This 
reflects an epistemological distinction between scientific knowledge concerning a 
natural phenomenon (say, genetic information which is encoded in a natural 
molecule) and scientific knowledge concerning an artificial phenomenon (say, genetic 
information which is encoded in an artificial molecule). According to the NCB: 
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“Patent offices take the view that extracting the genetic information 
encoded by a DNA sequence is not just a matter of gaining scientific 
knowledge about a natural phenomenon: it involves the use of 
cloning techniques to create an artificial molecule in such a way that 
it includes much the same genetic information as is to be found in 
the natural phenomenon. And what is held to be important here is 
that the scientific knowledge concerning the genetic information has 
been discovered through the creation of the artificial molecule. That 
is to say, without isolating and cloning a gene it is not possible to 
identify the sequence of bases of which it is comprised”.75  
 
Certainly, patent offices, by taking this view, aim to demonstrate that genetic 
information (as to how proteins are to be constructed) encoded in an artificial 
molecule is not mere “discovery” but “invention” and therefore, according to law, 
patentable. Nevertheless, it is clear that both forms of scientific knowledge refer to the 
same information namely, human genetic information. Whether this information is 
discovered through a natural molecule in the human body (naturally occurred genes) 
or through the creation of an artificial molecule isolated from the human body (cloned 
genes) is a matter of the scientific route followed and not a matter of the information 
as such. Ontologically speaking, in both cases, human genetic information is the 
same. For this reason, according to the NCB: 
 
“as computational techniques replace cloning as the main route to 
identifying genes, the issue of the eligibility for patenting of DNA 
sequences needs to be reopened. The fact that DNA sequences 
obtained by cloning have in the past been regarded as eligible for 
patenting does not imply that they should continue to be eligible for 
patenting when they can be identified from databases constructed by 
others”.76 
 
Whatever epistemological and ontological problems the current legislation faces, it is 
clear that human gene patents contain private property claims to different ways of 
using a DNA sequence. These ways include: 
 
“i) Diagnostic testing. The presence of a faulty gene in an individual 
can be detected by techniques based on knowledge of the structure of 
the gene… 
 
ii) Research tools. Since all genes encode parts of biological 
pathways and systems, knowledge of their DNA sequence can help in 
the identification of potential targets for which new drugs can be 
designed and in the development of new vaccines… 
 
iii) Gene therapy. The main aim here is to replace a faulty gene with 
a normal gene by introducing it into the body. This approach is 
being pursued in the development of treatment for diseases including 
cystic fibrosis, various cancers and disorders and the immune 
system. 
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iv) The production of therapeutic proteins to be used as medicines. 
Here, a distinctive therapeutic use has been identified for the protein 
encoded by DNA sequence”77 
 
The NCB examines whether granting patents on each of these ways of using a DNA 
sequence can meet the legal criteria for patenting, ie, novelty, inventiveness and 
utility. Nevertheless, it does not answer the question of liberal morality: can granting 
patents on diagnostic testing, research tools, gene therapies, and therapeutic proteins 
be morally grounded upon principles of natural law, personality development, just 
reward and social welfare? To answer this question let us consider the moral 
justification of at least two different ways of using a DNA sequence separately: 
diagnostic testing and research tools. 
 
Diagnostic Testing 
 
Diagnostic testing is based on the scientific identification of DNA sequences that are 
implicated in a disease.78 For instance, the identification of the BRCA1 gene located 
to chromosome 17 is implicated in some forms of breast cancer and for this reason 
has been used to develop the BRCA1 diagnostic test. In 1995 patents of the BRCA1 
gene sequence and various mutations were granted to Myriad Genetics, the Universit
of Utah Research Foundation and the US Secretary of Health. These patents give the
owners not only monopoly on their diagnostic method, but also the opportunity to 
prevent others from developing improved diagnostic methods, using the same DNA 
sequence. 
y 
ir 
 
Natural Law 
Can patents of diagnostic tests such as the BRCA1 be morally justified on the grounds 
of natural law? The answer is negative. First of all, the Lockean principle of self-
ownership does not apply in the case of BRCA1. The latter is not a sequence that is 
deliberately created by a scientist who has mixed her labour with an unowned human 
gene, but a natural phenomenon that already exists. From this it follows that the 
association between a gene variant and a disease such as breast cancer is not an 
artificial creation (by anyone who has mixed her labour with a human gene), but a 
phenomenon that already exists in nature. Therefore, a scientist trying to isolate the 
BRCA1 gene sequence does not have a justified property claim to that gene sequence. 
The isolation of a gene from its natural environment or production by means of 
technical process cannot possibly give rise to a property claim to the isolated gene 
under a Lockean mixing-labour justification for property because this presupposes the 
transformation of an isolated (abstract) gene into something valuable (and concrete). 
Discovery is not a creation of value through labour. In Locke’s theory, a person who 
mixes her labour with an unowned (concrete) object improves that object creating 
value that did not exist. “Property for Locke is the reward for the conversion or 
‘improvement’ of nature”. 79 Therefore, this theory might justify private property of a 
diagnostic method but not private property of an isolated gene sequence. 
 
Second, it might be argued that even if the Lockean principle of self-ownership could 
apply in patents of diagnostic tests such as BRCA1, these would still be morally 
unjustified because they would violate the proviso of “enough and as good”. 
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Specifically, the assertion of private property rights over a unique genetic information 
such as the BRCA1 gene sequence does not leave “enough and as good” to others. As 
the NCB puts it, “when developing products based on genetic material […] this 
concept of inventing around is harder to apply because there may be no alternatives to 
the naturally occurring DNA sequences”.80 This worsens the situation of others 
because it creates fewer chances for them to develop an improved diagnostic test than 
they would otherwise have if the BRCA1 gene were not patented.81 Licensing patents 
of diagnostic tests does not resolve the problem. According to a recent OECD report:  
 
“A survey of the licensing practices of holders of patents that cover 
diagnosis of genetic disorders showed that almost all the patents 
were being licensed exclusively; in theory this could allow the 
monopolisation of genetic testing services.”82 
 
The cost of exclusively licensed patents is extremely high. This prohibits the 
provision of genetic testing services, increasing health inequities in a liberal society in 
which social justice is already marginalised.83 For instance, how one would answer 
the following question? “Whether it is just for only those who can afford genetic 
services to have access to them, especially since much of the initial research that led 
to these services was publicly funded?”.84  
 
Personality Development 
Can patents of diagnostic tests such as for BRCA1 be justified on the grounds of moral 
necessity for personality development? It might be argued that patents of diagnostic 
tests cannot be morally justified on such grounds because human gene sequences are 
not intellectual creations expressing the personality of the scientist(s). Scientific 
knowledge and information are more neutral towards personality and values than 
other intellectual products. Thus, human gene sequences such as BRCA1 rather 
express the interaction between biological and environmental factors and their impact 
on human beings. 
 
On the other hand, patents of diagnostic tests cannot be taken to express the social 
recognition of the scientist(s) who identified a DNA sequence. Social recognition 
depends on whether such identification and the subsequent development of diagnostic 
testing satisfy the social need for better public health. Satisfaction of the social need 
for better public health does not necessarily presuppose private property and capitalist 
market. 
 
Just Reward 
Does the scientist(s) who identified a particular human gene sequence implicated in a 
disease morally deserve to be rewarded with a patent for her enterprise and merit? In 
response to this question it might be said, first of all, that a scientist is not an abstract 
individual who lives her life outside society. Therefore, her enterprise and merit are 
social developments. Libertarian theories of justice such as that of Nozick fail to 
understand the concept of individual within the context of society. 85 For this reason, 
they hide behind their problematical interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative, 
arguing that any state intervention in private ownership (eg, compulsory license) for 
the sake of society’s benefit is morally wrong. In fact, if one accepts that enterprise 
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and merit come about with the contribution of the whole of society, one has also to 
accept that no scientist(s) deserves to benefit exclusively from them. 
 
Social Welfare 
Can patents of human gene sequences morally justified on utilitarian grounds? It 
might be said that utility is the point at which certain criteria of liberal morality meet 
certain criteria of legality. Therefore, a human gene patent that is not useful to society 
or has no industrial application is neither moral nor legal. The obvious question here 
is the following: Does the granting of patents on DNA sequences such as BRCA1 and 
subsequently diagnostic testing for diseases like breast cancer maximise social 
welfare? With respect to this question, one might distinguish between different 
arguments. 
 
One argument is that, without patents of DNA sequences, the development of new 
diagnostic tests would be significantly reduced, minimising social welfare. This 
argument takes account of the significant effort and investment required for testing 
very large genes or multiple mutations and converting scientific knowledge into 
clinically reliable diagnostic tests and medicine. Therefore, protection through gene 
patents is viewed as economic incentive for the development of diagnostic tests, and 
thereby maximising utility.86 It might be said that this view is not entirely convincing. 
Is private property of genetic information the only economic incentive for the 
development of diagnostic tests? Is there empirical evidence for the maximisation of 
social welfare as a consequence of patents of diagnostic tests? The answer to these 
questions is rather negative. Asserting private property rights over genetic information 
and subsequent products reduces free competition and increases monopoly in the 
market. Therefore, it is an illiberal step that minimises social utility. 
 
Another argument with respect to diagnostic tests is that in some areas patents are not 
even necessary. According to the NCB: 
 
“Many conventional diagnostic tests for a wide range of diseases 
and disorders have used the presence or absence of other molecules 
such as proteins as a means of detection. By comparison with 
medicines, the costs of research and development in the case of 
diagnostic tests have been relatively low, the time for development 
relatively short, and the impact of regulation reduced”.87 
 
Although one might think of maximisation of social welfare as a consequence of the 
absence of patents, this still has to be empirically verified. Given the epistemological 
difficulty of measuring social utility objectively, both agreements (for and against 
human gene patents) lack strong empirical foundation. 
 
Research Tools 
 
A DNA sequence that has use in research but no immediate therapeutic or diagnostic 
value is defined as a research tool. According to the NCB: 
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“Over the past few years, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of patents that assert rights over DNA sequences that fall 
into the category of research tools”.88 
 
For instance, since 1990s, researchers have extensively used partial DNA sequence or 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs) as “a shortcut to identifying genes”.89 Some 
pharmaceutical companies immediately took the opportunity to fill patent applications 
in order to secure exclusive rights to the whole genes (whenever these would be 
identified). Granting patents over parts of genes means that these can be privately 
owned as research tools, excluding others from research to identify the whole genes. 
According to Hopkins et al: 
 
“Research tools were the largest component of granted patent 
portfolios in most pharma and biotech firms, with a majority 
reporting that more than 60% of their portfolios had applications in 
this category”.90 
 
Natural Law 
Can patents on research tools such as ESTs be morally justified on the grounds of 
natural law? The answer is again negative. ESTs are not intellectual creations of 
scientists but natural phenomena the discovery of which results in the identification of 
full-length DNA sequences. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that scientists are morally 
justified to own ESTs on the grounds of self-ownership. Even if one argued that 
human genes are unowned information - even if one could mix her labour with these 
(abstract) information - one could not claim ownership unless she could create 
something different out of these information. In the case of ESTs and full-length DNA 
sequences, what we have is scientific discovery, ie, discovery of information that 
already exists in nature.91  
 
It might be said that even if the principle of self-ownership could apply to patents of 
research tools such as ESTs, these would still violate the Lockean provisos of 
“enough and as good” and “non-waste”. First of all, each EST should be regarded as 
unique genetic information. ESTs are not abundant in nature. Therefore, the assertion 
of patent rights over ESTs does not leave “enough and as good” to others. The 
problem here is that if someone has a patent on a partial DNA sequence or EST, the 
patent will also extend to the full DNA sequence, even if the full sequence may be 
isolated by someone else without using the particular EST as a research tool92. This 
results in blocking patents or increased research and transaction costs. According to 
the OECD, “Even where patent owners are amenable to licensing, the price demanded 
for use of a genetic invention might pose a barrier to researcher”. Second, patenting of 
partial DNA sequence or ESTs implies patenting of a DNA sequence the function of 
which is unknown. If for some reason (say, high cost) no new drugs or other research 
could came out of the patented DNA sequence or ESTs, the “non-waste” proviso 
would be violated. Indeed, as the OECD stresses, “patents on early ‘foundational’ 
discoveries, if not widely licensed, may discourage or limit the use of these important 
innovations and slow the pace of R&D in a particular field.”93  
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Personality Development 
Can patents of research tools such as ESTs be morally justified on the grounds of 
necessity for personality development? It might be said that, since partial and full 
DNA sequences are not artificial creations but discoveries, they do not reflect the 
personality of scientists. In addition to this, patents of research tools such as ESTs do 
not express social recognition of scientists. The knowledge developed by the use of 
patented research tools might result in a monopoly of new drugs or other research. 
This might increase cost and therefore might not satisfy the needs of society for better 
health welfare and resources. 
 
Just Reward 
Does the scientist(s) who discovered a partial DNA sequence deserve to be rewarded 
with a patent of research tool for her enterprise and merit? The answer is negative. As 
has been stressed in the previous case of diagnostic tests, no enterprise and merit 
come about without the contribution of the whole of society. Therefore, no scientist(s) 
deserves to benefit exclusively from them. 
 
On the other hand, Kant’s categorical imperative can have a different application in 
the cases of partial and full DNA sequences of humans. For instance, this imperative 
might not allow patents of research tools: if one accepts that, whether isolated from 
the human body or not, human genes are ontologically the same, one has to accept 
that they have to be treated as ends in themselves and not as merely means to utility.  
 
Social Welfare 
Are patents of research tools morally justified on the grounds of maximising social 
welfare? As has been argued throughout this paper, the epistemological problem of 
utilitarianism limits objective moral judgement. Theoretically, patents on research 
tools may inhibit social welfare in various ways. According to the NCB, these ways 
include: 
 
 the cost of research may increase […]  research may […] be made more difficult if researchers are 
required first to negotiate the use of patented genes and 
sequences;  a patent owner may withhold a license to gain maximum 
financial benefits, or license it exclusively to one or a limited 
number of licenses;  companies that wish to acquire the rights to several DNA 
sequences may decide not to develop a therapeutic protein or 
diagnostic test because of the number of royalty payments that 
would be required […]’94 
 
Although the NCB recognises that there is no sufficient empirical evidence to support 
all the above statements, there are cases in which social welfare is dramatically 
minimised and which, therefore, need to be avoided. One of those is the case of the 
CCR5 receptor. According to the NCB: 
 
“In February 2000, Human Genome Sciences Inc (HGS), a US 
company, was granted a US patent which asserted rights over the 
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gene that codes for CCR 5 receptor. The CCR 5 receptor is the route 
by which the HIV/AIDS virus enters a cell. When HGS originally 
isolated the gene for this receptor and filed the for the patent in June 
1995 […] they were unaware of the receptor’s role in HIV/AIDS 
[…]. Subsequently the role of CCR 5 receptor was revealed by other 
researchers, six months after HGS filed its patent application. 
Another researcher, Dr M Parmentier, had isolated the gene some 
years earlier but only filed a patent application in March 1996 […]. 
Parmentier’s patent has not yet been granted”.95 
 
In order to avoid a case such as that of the CCR5 receptor, the NCB discourages 
patents which assert rights over DNA sequences as research tools. For the same 
reason, Cornish et al recommend that the Department of Health “should not adopt a 
hard and fast rule regarding the patentability of research tools”. 96  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the moral justifications of IPRs, taking a closer look at the 
case of human gene patents. Theoretically, IPRs cannot be sustained as liberal moral 
rights. On the one hand, they cannot be justified on the grounds of Locke’s theory of 
property because the application of “no waste” and “enough and as good” provisos in 
the private appropriation of intangible resources is problematical. On the other hand, 
IPRs cannot be justified as a necessity for personality development because the 
Hegelian approach to IP leaves open the epistemological question of personality 
embodiment in IP products and fails to resolve the problem of social recognition of IP 
creators. Also, IPRs can neither constitute just reward for enterprise nor merit. 
Individual inventors do not morally deserve to be rewarded for their natural qualities 
and talents. Finally, IPRs might fail the universal test of social utility. Therefore, 
utilitarianism does not necessarily justify IPRs. 
 
The implausibility of IPRs is strongly reflected in the case of human gene patents. 
First of all, patents of diagnostic tests and research tools cannot be morally justified 
because DNA sequences are natural phenomena and not creations of human labour 
which can be privately owned. In addition to this, the Lockean provisos of “no-waste” 
and “enough and as good” cannot justify patents because these do not leave 
alternatives to the naturally occurring DNA sequences. Second, patents of human 
genes cannot be justified on the grounds of personality development. Since DNA 
sequences are natural phenomena and not artificial creations, they reflect interactions 
between biological and environmental factors and not personality. Third, scientists 
who identify human gene sequences do not morally deserve to benefit exclusively for 
their enterprise and merit. The latter come about with the contribution of society as a 
whole. Fourth, patents of human gene sequences are not always justified on utilitarian 
grounds. The problem here is that patents of diagnostic tests and research tools do not 
always maximise social welfare. To make things worst, utility is epistemologically 
difficult to be measured. 
 
As has been stressed elsewhere,97 IPRs are rather political developments which aim to 
reproduce the capitalist division of knowledge and labour. In this sense, it can be 
concluded that their extension to genomics is not morally defensible. It constitutes a 
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political decision that, in fact, sacrifices liberal morality on the altar of genetic 
information feudalism. According to Drahos and Braithwaite: 
 
“The redistribution of property rights in the case of information 
feudalism involves a transfer of knowledge assets from intellectual 
commons into private hands […] The effect of this […] is to raise 
levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous global heights, at 
a time when states, which have been weakened by the forces of 
globalisation, have less capacity to protect their citizens from 
consequences of the exercise of this power”.98 
 
In the case of human gene patents, information feudalism involves a transfer of 
human genetic knowledge from the “common heritage of humanity”99 to private 
hands. 
 
In essence, genetic information feudalism is nothing but another antinomy of 
capitalism through which the division of knowledge and labour are reproduced as 
genetically and socially founded class divisions100 between individuals and between 
nation states. This antinomy not only threatens equality but also liberty and human 
welfare. IPRs violate scientists’ right of freedom to research and improvement of the 
human condition. 
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